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The paper analyzes under what conditions spiteful preferences are
evolutionarily stable applying the indirect evolution approach. With
a quadratic material payo¤ function, spiteful preferences are evolu-
tionarily stable for a large set of parameters. It is shown that strate-
gic substitutability or complementarity is endogenous property of the
game played with evolutionarily stable preferences. Its relation to
properties of the material payo¤ function is analyzed. Finally, it is
shown that with incomplete information only sel…sh preferences are
evolutionarily stable.
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11 Introduction
A fundamental assumption in economics is that economic agents care only
about their own utility. This point was defended by Alchian (1950) and
Friedman (1953) by stating that if it were not the case, agents not maximizing
their utility would be eliminated by evolution. It has been shown recently
that in a strategic interaction context with complete information this is not
necessarily true (see, e.g. Bester and Güth (1998) and Koçkesen et al. (1997))
while an incomplete information setting supports the claim (see Ely and
Yilankaya (1997)).
This paper applies the indirect evolution approach to games which can
arise from di¤erentiated products oligopoly games. However, we abstract
from oligopoly setting and focus more on certain properties of the game and
the payo¤ function. The indirect evolution approach, initiated by Güth and
Yaari (1992), works on preferences rather than on strategies. Given play-
ers’ preferences, they play an equilibrium of the game with their subjective
preferences. Given equilibrium strategies, one can calculate the …tness of
a player by substituting the equilibrium strategies into the material payo¤s
game. The evolution will select the preferences that have higher …tness. We
are interested in stationary points of evolutionary process, that is such prefer-
ences that are robust to invasion of a small number of mutants. These points
are the evolutionarily stable strategies of a game where the strategy sets are
possible preferences and the payo¤s are the material payo¤s corresponding
to the equilibrium strategies of the game with given preferences.
Thus, the evolution is assumed to work in a large population of players
who are randomly matched to play a two–player game. In the game they are
either able to …nd an equilibrium or learn to play it su¢ciently fast so that
the evolution works on the equilibrium outcomes. In the duopoly context the
evolution can be interpreted as a cultural phenomenon changing preferences
(priorities) of a given …rm as it observes a number of other …rms in other
duopoly markets.
Bester and Güth (1998) have analyzed the model but they restricted pref-
erences to a convex combination of egoistic (maximizing own pro…t) and al-
truistic (maximizing sum of pro…ts) preferences. In a quadratic setting they
showed that altruism is evolutionarily stable with strategic complements.
With strategic substitutes no altruism survives and egoistic preferences are
evolutionarily stable. The last result appears because the preference param-
eter is restricted to lie between egoistic and altruistic values. We remove
2this restriction on preference parameter by introducing spiteful preferences.
The spiteful preferences resemble negative reciprocity like altruism resem-
bles positive reciprocity and therefore they are not uncommon. Moreover,
they are linked with imitative behavior which was analyzed, for example
in Vega-Redondo (1997). We show that (partially) spiteful preferences are
evolutionarily stable when egoism was stable in Bester and Güth (1998).
Further, strategic complementarity or substitutability, represented by the
slope of the reaction functions, can be an endogenous property of the game.
The game played with evolutionarily stable preference parameters is deter-
mined endogenously here and, therefore, strategic complementarity or sub-
stitutability of it is a result of the evolution rather then the cause deter-
mining what evolutionarily stable preferences are. The basic element of the
analysis is the material payo¤ function. Its properties, such as sub- or super-
modularity can provide some light for the result. We will see, however, that
they are not always enough to provide an unambiguous answer for games
going beyond standard di¤erentiated product games but have similar struc-
ture.
Finally, in the preferences of the opponent are not known, we will show
that then maximizing the material payo¤s is the only evolutionarily stable
preferences and, therefore, with incomplete information the claim of Alchian
(1950) and Friedman (1953) is valid in the context analyzed in the paper.
An open question remains if it is true in general.
We proceed as following. In Section 2 we include spiteful preferences in
Bester-Güth framework while keeping other restrictions intact. In Section 3
we relax some other assumptions and illustrate that strategic complementar-
ity or substitutability is endogenously determined. Section 4 considers the
model with incomplete information. Some conclusions are drawn in Section
5.
2 The Bester-Güth Model with Spiteful Pref-
erences
2.1 The Indirect Evolution
Here we formulate shortly how the indirect evolution works for general games.
In following subsection we analyze the model of Bester and Güth (1998) with
quadratic functions.
3Güth and Yaari (1992) initiated the indirect evolution approach to the
evolution of preferences in games. Consider a symmetric two-player game
G with strategy sets S1 and S2. The payo¤s U1(s1;s2);U2(s1;s2) are the
material payo¤s or the …tness of players 1 and 2. Let W be a set of possible
preferences.
Consider now a game G0 with the same strategy sets but with players
having preferences represented by payo¤ functions V1(s1;s2);V2(s1;s2). We
can …nd an outcome of G0 which is considered plausible. If G0 has a unique
equilibrium, it is natural to assume that the equilibrium will be played. Even
if G0 does not have an equilibrium or has multiple equilibria, there are ways
to select one of them, e.g. by learning processes (see, for instance, Kandori
et al. (1993)). We will address this problem in the particular example later.
Assume that for any given pair of preferences V1;V2 from W a unique
outcome of the game is found, together with corresponding strategies s¤
1;s¤
2.
Then one can …nd the …tness of a player with given preferences by substi-
tuting the equilibrium strategies into the material payo¤ function. Let us
denote the resulting function for player 1 by U¤
1(V1;V2). The material payo¤
for player 2 is found by symmetry.
De…ne an evolutionary game ¡ as a symmetric game with strategy sets W
and with payo¤ function U¤
1(V1;V2). The de…nition of evolutionary stability
for one population symmetric games is standard (see, e.g. Weibull (1995))
De…nition 2.1 Strategy V ¤ is evolutionary stable if
(i) U¤
1(V ¤;V ¤) ¸ U¤
1(V;V ¤) 8V
(ii) if U¤
1(V ¤;V ¤) = U¤
1(V;V ¤) then U¤
1(V ¤;V ) > U¤
1(V;V )
The evolutionarily stable preferences are the ones which are evolutionarily
stable in ¡.
De…nition 2.2 Preferences V ¤ are evolutionarily stable if they are evolu-
tionary stable strategy in ¡.
Thus, …nding the evolutionarily stable preferences allows us to say which
preferences are robust with respect to a invasion of a small number of mu-
tants in a large population with random matching. Evolutionary stability
does not necessary guarantee that an evolutionary process will converge to
the evolutionarily stable strategy. It can also happen that there is no evolu-
tionarily stable strategy. However, we will see that this concept allows us to
draw some conclusions in certain games.
42.2 The Quadratic Example
Let G be a symmetric game with strategy sets of all nonnegative real num-
bers. Let x ¸ 0 be the strategy of Player 1 and y ¸ 0 be the strategy of
Player 2. The material payo¤s of the game are given by
U1(x;y) = x(ky + m ¡ x);U2(x;y) = y(kx + m ¡ y) (1)
where ¡1 < k < 1;k 6= 0;m > 0. These restrictions will guarantee the
uniqueness of equilibrium together with assumptions on preference parame-
ters later.
The players do not necessarily maximize their material payo¤s. The set
of possible preferences consists of following linear combinations of own and
opponent’s payo¤s:
V1(x;y) = U1(x;y) + ®U2(x;y);V2(x;y) = U2(x;y) + ¯U1(x;y) (2)
where ®;¯ 2 [¡1;1] are preference parameters. Thus the set W corresponds
to the interval [¡1;1]. This formulation is slightly di¤erent from the one
of Bester and Güth (1998) but easier to work with. The bounds on the
parameters will guarantee uniqueness of the equilibrium but we will relax
them later.
If ® = 0, player 1 maximizes material payo¤s. ® > 0 means that the
player is altruistic that is takes into account the opponent’s pro…t with a
positive value, while ® < 0 represents spiteful preferences that is ones where
opponent’s pro…t reduces one’s utility. The same description is valid for
player 2’s parameter ¯. The parameters ®;¯ are common knowledge for the
players. This assumption is important and the consequences of its relaxation
will be analyzed in Section 4.
The players maximize their corresponding subjective utility functions
V1;V2 with parameters ®;¯. The reaction functions derived from the …rst
order conditions (second order conditions are always satis…ed) are
x =
k(® + 1)y + m
2
;y =
k(¯ + 1)x + m
2
(3)
The slope of the reaction functions depends only on k since ®+1 is always
nonnegative. If k > 0 then the reaction functions are upward sloping, thus
strategies are complements. If k < 0, the reaction functions are downward
sloping and strategies are substitutes.
5The unique equilibrium of the game is given by
x
¤(®;¯) =
m(k(® + 1) + 2)
4 ¡ k2(® + 1)(¯ + 1)
;y
¤(®;¯) =
m(k(¯ + 1) + 2)
4 ¡ k2(® + 1)(¯ + 1)
(4)
Given the equilibrium strategies the …tness of a player is the material
payo¤ she gets in the equilibrium. This de…nes an evolutionary game on
preferences.
The material payo¤ of player 1 as a function of preference parameters




m2(k(® + 1) + 2)(k2®(¯ + 1) + k(® ¡ 1) ¡ 2)
(4 ¡ k2(® + 1)(¯ + 1))2 (5)
while the material payo¤ function of player 2 satis…es U¤
2(¯;®) = U¤
1(®;¯).
An evolutionarily stable strategy for the game ¡ on preference parameters









To check the necessary condition for the condition (a), requiring a sym-
metric equilibrium of the evolutionary game ¡, we …x the second argument
of U¤
1(®;¯), …nd maxima of it with respect to the …rst argument and equate
the arguments. The …rst order condition is
® = ¡
k(¯ + 1)(k + 2)
¯k(k ¡ 2) + k2 ¡ 2k ¡ 4
(6)













The boundary values ®¤ = ¡1 and ®¤ = 1 are possible candidates too.








4 > 0 if k 6= 0. Thus, ®¤ = ¡1 cannot be evolutionarily stable as it is
not a best reply against itself in the evolutionary game ¡. If ¯ = 1 then
@U¤
1(®;1)
@® j®=1= ¡ m2k2
8(k+1)(k¡1)2 < 0 thus U¤
1(®;1) is decreasing in ® around
® = 1. Since U¤
1(®;1) is continuous, it implies that there exist an ®0 < 1
6such that U¤
1(®0;1) > U¤
1(1;1). Thus, ® = 1 is not a best reply against itself
either and, therefore, is not evolutionarily stable.
Note that for ¡1 < k < 1 ®¤
1 is never between -1 and 1 thus we can ignore















) ¸ 0 8® ()
m2(k + 2)(k ¡ 2)
16(k ¡ 1)
¡
m2(k + 2)(k ¡ 2)(k2(® + 1)2 ¡ 4)
4(k2(® + 1) + 2k ¡ 4)2 ¸ 0 8® ()
(k
2(® + 1) + 2k ¡ 4)
2 ¡ (k
2(® + 1)
2 ¡ 4)4(k ¡ 1) ¸ 0 8® ()
(k(® + 1) ¡ 2®)
2 ¸ 0 8®
The last inequality is always satis…ed and turns to equality only when
® = k
2¡k. This means that ®¤
2 is the unique best response against itself and,
therefore, evolutionarily stable. We have
Proposition 2.1 The unique evolutionarily stable preference parameter is
®¤ = k
2¡k.
This result extends the Bester-Güth example to spiteful preferences. For
positive k the result is the same. Some amount of altruism is evolutionarily
stable. News comes when k is negative. If k < 0 then ®¤ < 0. This means
that spiteful preferences are evolutionarily stable when material payo¤ func-
tion is sub-modular and, given the restrictions on the parameters, therefore
the strategies of the game G are strategic substitutes. An interesting di¤er-
ence between positive and negative values of k is that as k ! 1, ®¤ ! 1,
that is altruism becomes ”perfect” as degree of complementarity between
strategies becomes perfect, while if k ! ¡1, ®¤ ! ¡1
3, that is the spite does
not gain full strength even when degree of substitutability is perfect. These
results are illustrated in Figure 1.
An implication of the above result is that in games with strategic sub-
stitutes it pays to be spiteful i.e. to care also about relative payo¤, though
to a certain degree. In a Cournot oligopoly, for example, it is evolutionar-
ily stable to have preferences not only over own pro…t but also over market
share since maximizing own market share implies minimizing the one of the
opponent and therefore minimizing opponent’s pro…t (see Dufwenberg and
Güth (1997)). In a Bertrand oligopoly it works the other way round. In our
model it is evolution that makes certain preferences proliferate. If a player
7Figure 1: Evolutionarily stable preferences
could choose and commit to certain preferences, she might rationally want
to have preferences that do not maximize own pro…t but a combination of
own and opponent’s pro…ts.
3 Further Extensions
We will stay in the framework of quadratic functions of Bester-Güth example
while removing parameter restrictions.
A logical step further than extension of the preferences to include spiteful
ones is to remove restrictions on the preference parameter altogether thus
allowing it to vary from ¡1 to +1. When ® can vary between ¡1 to +1,
we can represent preferences from pure spite, i.e. minimizing opponent’s
payo¤ (® ! ¡1), to relative pro…t maximization (® = ¡1), to maximizing
own material payo¤ (® = 0), to maximizing sum of the payo¤s (® = 1), to
pure altruism, i.e. maximizing other’s payo¤ (® ! +1). This range covers
a much larger span of preferences than the original Bester-Güth model.
There are two problems with this extension. The …rst one is that if one
keeps the restrictions x ¸ 0;y ¸ 0 then corner solutions appear too often.
This will require further assumptions on the cases with no or more than one
equilibria than the ones in the following paragraph. This will make the anal-
ysis more complicated without changing qualitative results. Furthermore,
the assumption of nonnegative strategy space comes from oligopoly interpre-
tation of the game. However, if one keeps strictly to oligopoly interpretation,
8one has to check also nonnegativity of variables representing both quanti-
ties and prices. This will complicate analysis even further and lead to cases
where no obvious extension of the evolutionary game to cases with no equi-
libria will be possible. Therefore we remove the nonnegativity restriction
altogether and will consider as strategy space the whole real line.
The second problem is that it might happen that there is no equilibrium
of the game with given preference parameters, or there is more than one
(continuum) of equilibria. In such a case the evolutionary game ¡ is not well
de…ned. A possible approach is to extend the …tness function U¤
1(®;¯) to
such preference parameters by continuity.
From equilibrium strategies equation (4) the game with preference param-
eters ®0;¯
0 does not have a unique equilibrium if 4 ¡ k2(®0 + 1)(¯
0 + 1) = 0.
For such ®0;¯




1(®;¯). This limit always exists on
the extended real line. We choose the continuity in the …rst argument since
an evolutionarily stable strategy is a best reply to itself and with continuous
function it is easier to …nd best replies.
Given this extension of the …tness function, the evolutionary game is well
de…ned and we can apply the concept of evolutionarily stable strategy. All
the derivations of the previous section come through except that now there
are no boundary candidates and that ®¤
1 = ¡k+2
k from (7) is a legitimate
candidate for an evolutionarily stable strategy. With the above extension
U¤
1(®;¡k+2
k ) = m2
4 8®. Condition (a) for evolutionary stability is satis…ed
with equality for any ®. However, U¤
1(¡k+2
k ;0) = 0 < U¤
1(0;0) = m2
(k¡2)2, thus
condition (b) is not satis…ed and ®¤
1 = ¡k+2
k is not evolutionarily stable. The
proof of evolutionary stability of ®¤
2 = k
2¡k comes through. We have
Proposition 3.1 Even with unrestricted preference parameters the unique
evolutionarily stable preference parameter is ®¤ = k
2¡k.
Notice that the slopes of the reaction functions (3) depend now on the
preference parameters in an essential manner. Depending whether the pref-
erence parameter is smaller or larger than ¡1, the game changes from one
with strategic complements to one with strategic substitutes and vice versa
depending on the sign of k. This indicates that the feature of strategic
complementarity or substitutability is determined endogenously, depend-
ing on which value of the preference parameter is evolutionarily stable. A
more fundamental feature is whether the material payo¤ function U(x;y) is
9sub- or super-modular. With ¡1 < k < 1 if the function is sub-modular
( @2U
@x@y = k < 0) then the game with evolutionarily stable preference param-
eters exhibits strategic substitutes, while if the function is super-modular
( @2U
@x@y = k > 0), the strategies of the resulting game are complements. A
natural question to ask is whether this property holds in general, namely for
other values of k.
The parameter k measures the degree of interdependence between players’
strategies. High value of k shows high degree of interdependence, which do
not occur in classical di¤erentiated Cournot and Bertrand games but can
occur in other economic games and, therefore, can be of interest.
Given the extension of the …tness function, the evolutionary game on
preference parameters is well de…ned for any k. Thus we only have to check
the two possible candidates for evolutionarily stable preference parameters
from (7). The above proof that ®¤
1 = ¡k+2
k is not evolutionarily stable works
for any k 6= 0. Therefore, we are left with only ®¤
2 = k
2¡k to check.
The second order condition for ®¤







k2m2(k + 2)(k ¡ 2)5
512(1 ¡ k)3 ￿ 0
The last inequality holds when k 2 [¡2;1][[2;+1). For other values of
k ®¤
2 is a strict local minimum therefore it cannot be evolutionarily stable.
For boundaries one can check that when k = ¡2 ®¤
2 is evolutionarily stable
while if k = 1 and k = 2 ®¤
2 is not evolutionarily stable. This gives us the
following
Proposition 3.2 There is
(i) unique evolutionarily stable preference parameter ®¤ = k
2¡k if the pa-
rameter k 2 [¡2;1)nf0g [ (2;+1);
(ii) no evolutionarily stable preference parameter otherwise.
While for k 2 [¡2;¡1] the result is a natural extension of the previous
result, indicating that evolutionarily stable preference parameter has some
degree of spite (®¤ = ¡1
2 when k = ¡2), a new result appears when k > 2. ®¤
is negative and larger than one in absolute value when k > 2. Thus, a large
degree of spite, up to minimizing opponent’s payo¤ (®¤ ! ¡1 when k !
2 from above) is evolutionarily stable when the degree of interdependence
between players’ strategies is high, though it is a positive interdependence!
10The result also shows that the question posed above has a negative an-
swer. For some k outside (¡1;1) interval no evolutionarily stable preference
parameter exists, so we cannot say anything about properties of the game
played with the evolutionarily stable preferences. More important, when
k > 2, the material payo¤ function U(x;y) is super-modular while the game
with evolutionarily stable parameter ®¤ exhibits strategic substitutes. Thus,
the property of perceived strategic substitutability or complementarity of
the game played with evolutionarily stable preferences is determined endoge-
nously and it does not have one-to-one relation with sub- or super-modularity
of the material payo¤ function.
4 Incomplete Information
In all of the above it was assumed that the players knew each other prefer-
ences. This assumption is rather strong. In this section we relax the complete
information assumption. Instead we will assume that players know the distri-
bution of preferences in the population. Thus, each encounter is a Bayesian
game where the set of types is a set of possible preferences and the payo¤ to
each type is given by its corresponding subjective utility function V .
To analyze the evolutionary stability of certain preference parameter ®
we will consider an invasion by a small number of mutants with some other
preference parameter ®0. The proportion " of mutants is common knowledge
and arbitrarily small. Thus, we have a Bayesian game with two types T =
f®;®0g, with prior on the set of types f1¡";"g, and with the payo¤ functions
for the two types
V®(x;y) = U1(x;y) + ®U2(x;y)
V®0(x;y) = U1(x;y) + ®
0U2(x;y)
where Ui(x;y) are given in (1).
We are looking for a symmetric equilibrium of the game. In the equi-
librium we can calculate the material payo¤s of the two types. Denote the
expected material payo¤ of the type ® in the equilibrium by U¤
a and that of
mutant type ®0 by U¤
a0. Since " is arbitrarily small we can take limit when
" ! 0.
De…nition 4.1 A preference parameter ®¤ is evolutionarily stable with in-
complete information if lim"!0U¤
®¤ > lim"!0U¤
® for any mutant type ®.
11Let us denote the strategy of player 1 by (x®;x®0) where x® is strategy
when the player is of type ® and x®0 is the strategy when the player is of
mutant type ®0. Let (y®;y®0) be the strategies for player 2. To …nd an




2V®(x®;y®) + (1 ¡ ")"V®(x®;y®0) +
+"(1 ¡ ")V®0(x®0;y®) + "
2V®0(x®0;y®0) (8)
and corresponding problem for player 2 which we omit because of symmetry.
The solution of the problems leads to
x® =
m(®"k ¡ ®0"k + 2)
2(®k(" ¡ 1) ¡ ®0"k ¡ k + 2)
;
x®0 =
m(®k(" ¡ 1) + ®0k(1 ¡ ") + 2)
2(®k(" ¡ 1) + ®0"k ¡ k + 2)
: (9)
These are the strategies of the two types in the symmetric equilibrium.








(®k + k ¡ 2)2 (10)







m2(®k + ®0k ¡ 2)(®k ¡ ®0k ¡ 2)
4(®k + k ¡ 2)2
(11)









4(®k + k ¡ 2)2 > 0 ()
®
02 ¡ ®
2 > 0 ()j ®
0 j>j ® j (12)
Therefore, we have
Proposition 4.1 The only evolutionarily stable preference parameter with
incomplete information is ®¤ = 0.
12For any other ® 6= 0 a mutant with the preference parameter closer to
0 achieves a higher payo¤. Thus, with incomplete information only prefer-
ences which coincide with the material payo¤ survive evolutionary pressure
thus supporting the claim of Alchian (1950) and Friedman (1953). A sim-
ilar result that with incomplete information the material payo¤ preferences
are evolutionary stable under certain conditions was obtained also in Güth
and Peleg (1997) and Ely and Yilankaya (1997). One of the conditions was
the existence of a pure equilibrium. My conjecture is that with a mixed
equilibrium involved in indirect evolution results might be di¤erent.
5 Conclusion
The indirect evolution approach helps to address the question which prefer-
ences will survive evolutionary pressure. However, one should not arti…cially
restrict preference parameters. In this paper we extended the model of Bester
and Güth (1998) to a larger set of preference parameters. We have shown
that when spiteful preference are allowed they can be evolutionarily stable
for a large set of values of the parameter of the material payo¤ function.
The set of preferences was still restricted to a linear combination of own
and opponent’s pro…ts. Of course, other preferences are possible, and even
more interesting to analyze, for example, more ”sympathetic” preferences of
Rabin (1993) or more ”emphatic” preferences of Bolle (1991) that might be
evolutionarily stable in place of spiteful or altruistic preferences. The focus of
the analysis was, however, on spiteful preferences and their ability to survive
evolution in the given class of preferences.
Admittedly, this model still analyzes speci…c forms of the material payo¤
function and preference function. Already in this restricted framework there
is a variety of results showing that some basic properties of the material
payo¤ function used in literature on preference formation are not enough
to draw general conclusions. The properties of the game played with the
evolutionarily stable preferences may be di¤erent from the properties of the
material payo¤ game.
The persistence of spiteful preferences, found in this paper, may be ex-
plained by the fact that a ”spiteful” player gets higher payo¤ that a ”normal”
player for a rather general class of games. An analysis of interdependent pref-
erences can be found in Koçkesen et al. (1997) though this result should be
taken with caution as it does not necessary mean that ”spiteful” players will
13wipe out ”normal” ones. Much depends on the exact formulation of the
model. In the random matching setting there is a counter-balancing e¤ect
that ”spiteful” players cooperate less with each other than ”normal” players.
The result of evolutionary process depends much on the parameters of the
material payo¤ function.
Preferences, di¤erent from maximizing own material payo¤, are evolu-
tionarily stable when players know each other preferences. In an incomplete
information setting only maximizing preferences survive. This result is of a
general character and supports the claim of Alchian (1950) and Friedman
(1953) that rationality will be selected by evolution. Thus, the informa-
tional issues play a large role in the determination of the outcomes of the
evolutionary process. This question deserves further research.
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